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**1963/06/20**

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( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR  
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR

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d. In either the palace revolt or popular uprising, without establishment of an organ, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political legitimacy, it is difficult to visualize an adequate political basis for overt US action unless Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots.

### 3. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea approaches to the Island. The security and military forces are sizable, well-ordered and effective. Twelve to fourteen thousand Soviet troops remain on the Island. Castro is the unchallenged leader of Cuba. The Regime is organizing a State party with a base of 60,000 members. An important minority of the Cuban people now apparently gives positive support to Castro, and the majority passively accepts his regime. Internal resistance is limited, uncoordinated, and badly equipped.

In this environment even though a palace revolt seems unlikely at this time, <sup>seems to be the</sup> most likely variant of insurgent action as well as the most likely to succeed without outside intervention. But in light

of the Cuban Security Organization described above, it is at present very substantial US military support, possibly as an unlikely that a revolt would be successful without a US invasion. <sup>th</sup>

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2 all of these forces  
for by CINCLANT CPL

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would detract from the combat power of the invasion forces to the smallest extent possible and not alter materially the location or timing of operations planned in OPLANS 312 and 316.

"Although the commitment of forces blindly to support the revolutionaries must be avoided, a rapid incremental (emphasis supplied) commitment of forces might be desirable. Such action would be justified under some or all of the following conditions:

"a. The uprising gives promise of success if US aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

"b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the United States.

"c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

"d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piecemeal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63.

"e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk."

The formation and maintenance in being of all-Cuban military units against the contingency of spontaneous revolt are not justified.

c. Status of Planning with Respect to a Post-Castro Regime

An Interdepartmental group has prepared a number of papers analyzing

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b. Regardless of its origin, almost any uprising is likely (i) swiftly to encounter serious difficulties, (ii) promptly to require US help and (iii) to lack any clear outline. JCS study has been given to the results which might be anticipated from execution of "portions of OPLA" - (air) including its UW (unconventional warfare) provisions." As a result, it is considered that US forces have the capability to isolate any area of Cuban territory during daylight by interdiction of military vehicles and troop concentrations, and to make such movement difficult at night. We estimate that air support is the type of help which a group of insurgents is most likely to need and which at the same time would bear the least political on-

c. Action by Soviet troops to suppress an uprising would more than any other single development call for US intervention. A military response by the US under such circumstances, however, could immediately bring about a direct US-Soviet confrontation. Therefore, an especially important objective would be to deter the Soviets from acting. The chances of Soviet intervention might be reduced by (1) a private warning to them not to intervene, (2) the speed and obvious determination with which the US is intervening, and (3) the avoidance of attacks on Soviet personnel and installations in Cuba. *unless there is an indication of a c* [if there is sufficient assurance that identifiable Soviet installations will remain neutral.] US planning should include

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On the level of military action, to the extent that circumstances permit, the US should conduct operations so as to leave to the Soviet Union the choice of whether to become directly involved with our armed forces. The quarantine is inherently such an action, but our air and ground forces would have to be given explicit instructions at the time on the conditions under which they would engage Soviet forces in Cuba. We should make this point quite clear to the Kremlin.

5. Operational Concept. The foregoing considerations point towards a concept of US involvement in two phases: an initial covert phase followed, as required, by an overt phase. In the application of military force, the basic political principle to be followed is that of support to the insurgents, of helping them to liberate Cuba themselves, although the US Government must be clear that support, once initiated overtly, will be made sufficient to insure success. From a political viewpoint it is essential that this posture be genuine and not open to the charge of being a facade for a forcible US overthrow of Castro. If the Soviets should intervene with their ground forces against the insurgents, the covert phase might turn out to be extremely short or non-existent. At the point of Soviet intervention, the US would side openly with t

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the Chairman (i) to comply with the sea and air quarantine to be effective as (time) and (ii) to order Soviet troops to specified concentration points to minimize Soviet loss of life (not to be included if Soviet forces already actively committed in support of the Castro Regime).

(4) Inform the UN Security Council under Article 54 of the UN Charter of the action taken in the OAS. Foretell Soviet moves in the UN.

(5) Seek the cooperation of selected Cuban exile leaders whose aims are compatible with those of the insurgent group within Cuba.

(6) Following recognition of the insurgents as the Government of Cuba convoke a joint session of Congress and announce US determination to commit all necessary resources in support of the new government.

Subsequently the US would:

(1) Designate a Special Representative of the President and move him with an inter-departmental staff to Cuban territory at the earliest possible moment, possibly even during the latter stages of the conduct of combat operations, to take over control from the military commander, of liaison between the USG and the provisional Government.

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(2) Assist with the establishment of a Provisional Government, as appropriate, and begin assistance in the reconstruction of Cuba.

(3) Facilitate the speedy departure of any remaining Soviet forces from the island, including protection and assistance in evading them.

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